INTRODUCTION
The European CSIRT 2 Network project eCSIRT.net -among other things -aimed at improving collaboration between European CSIRTs (see [5] ). One purpose was to facilitate a better understanding of daily CSIRT work and a second purpose was to generally raise public awareness for Internet security. A key component to accomplish the latter was the deployment of several IDS sensors in different European countries and to analyse and present the attack data gathered. The distributed sensor network was completed by a central manager responsible for storing all attacks reported by the sensors into a database.
The following section will describe the realisation of the distributed sensor network focusing both on policy and technical issues. The section thereafter will briefly summarise the period of operation, followed by the actual statistics and analyses as well as some thoughts about the validity of the data. The paper will be concluded by a summary and a glance at the next steps of evolution planned.
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REALISATION
First of all it has to be understood, that IDS -distributed or not -don't increase the security of a network all by themselves. The authors prefer to think of IDS as means of learning more about your networked environments and as means to validate certain assumptions as to what may or may not happen within your network.
There are basically two types of IDS: signature-and anomaly-(or statistics-) based. Signature-based IDS can be compared to most anti virus-scanners: They only report matches against their signature database, i.e. they won't be able to "see" anything not contained in their database.
Statistics-based IDS will report deviations of normal networkoperation. The key problems to be addressed in this case are the definition of "normal" and of the corresponding thresholds for deviations.
Ideally, everything that is reported by an IDS is an unauthorised use of computer-or network-resources, for example an intrusion attempt.
In reality most IDS have the problem of generating large numbers of false positives, i.e. "alerts", which are not related to any malicious activity. Also attacks may occur without any IDS reporting it.
Preparation
The most crucial parts of a distributed IDS are the individual IDS sensors, usually placed directly into corporate networks (for further details see section 3.2, in particular Fig. 1 ). The goal to be achieved by placing sensors in such a way is to record typical attacks in an authentic manner.
During planning trust and privacy quickly evolved as two of the primary concerns of all participating members. This is highly understandable since a sensor placed directly into a corporate network may see very intimate details not intended for an outsider. Consequently these issues were addressed by the following policy:
1. Each sensor only receives IP-packets directly addressed to its designated IP-address. Other communication must not be listened to. 2. Every transmission of attacks recorded by the sensors is encrypted via SSL thus preventing forgery and eavesdropping. Encryption via SSL also provides authentication. 3. All participating teams have to be trusted. This is formalised by either being an official member of the project itself or by being accredited by the Trusted Introducer Service (TI), a service designed to help establishing paths of trust between European CSIRTs (also see [7] and http://www.ti.terena.nl/) Trust is necessary because every participant has access to all the data collected. 4. For any information to be published its contributors (the teams whose sensors were attacked) have to provide clearance. All data and all analyses generally intended for the public are explicitly agreed upon. 5. Each sensor should run on designated hardware. These decisions heavily influenced further design, because IDS need network-traffic to be monitored: On the one hand an IDS doesn't actively participate in any network-communication. But on the other hand, due to design decision 1, they cannot listen to attacks against services provided on the same network segment, either.
In the scenario just described the only attacks that an IDS will record are those targeted directly at the IP-address of the corresponding sensor. Actually without any further measures the sensors will only be able to see attacks which don't require an answer from the potential victim, e.g. some UDP-based or scanning attacks. Therefore, in order to "appear on a potential attacker's radar", the sensors themselves must provide some services via TCP.
Consequently each sensor was equipped with a honeypot, which effectively resulted in superimposing a distributed honeynet on the distributed sensor network in order to provide attackable services for each sensor (for further details see section 3.4).
A honeypot is a non-production system connected to a network with the sole purpose of attracting attackers without letting them gain control over any valuable information or infrastructure, in order to learn more about attackers and attacks. For more information see for example [5c] .
Architecture
The actual architecture of the sensor network can be schematically seen from Fig. 1 together with these explanations: -Each sensor is directly connected to the Internet (no masquerading, NAT or firewalling). -The central server collects all the attacks recorded by the sensors. The sensors do not store any data at all. -All sensors boot from identical CDROMs, thus running the same software (Prelude-NIDS, Honeyd etc.) with identical configurations except for their own IP-addresses.
Requirements
Two perspectives had to be taken into account for defining all requirements. The first one was of the persons actually running a sensor. The goal here was to basically provide "plug'n play". The second perspective was of those responsible for running the central manager. Here, the focus rather was on organisational issues like being able to handle the network traffic. 
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Additional criteria were -security and privacy, as stated in section 3.1, -scalability, i.e. being able to add as many sensors as needed, -reliability, because maintaining a widespread network can be a challenging task, and -extensibility, so that new features can be added without problems.
Implementation
After careful evaluation the following main components were chosen for the distributed IDS sensor network:
-Prelude as IDS framework ( [12] ), -Honeyd to provide attackable services ( [10] ), -Crypto-NTP to allow for synchronisation of the system clocks ( [8] ), -Knoppix ( [6] ) as basis for the sensors and -a floppy disk customised for each sensor.
As possible alternatives for the IDS framework AirCERT ( [9] ) and M-ICE ( [2] ) were also considered. Compared to Prelude, however, both are limited in functionality. AirCERT only provides one type of sensor (network), whereas Prelude allows for different types. M-ICE on the other hand focuses on host-based sensors.
Prelude has very much been designed for distributed environments. Sensors collect data about attacks wherever it may be desired and forward it to a manager, who in turn can either store all incidents received or relay them to another manager. This way it is possible to build complex topologies for a distributed sensor network. Examples for sensors include the network IDS sensor (Prelude-NIDS) or a strictly host-based sensor. The former is responsible for watching any network-based attacks and the latter for reporting local events like failed login attempts.
Furthermore Prelude supports IDMEF, a standardised format to exchange incident data (see [3] ), and Snort (see [11] ) signatures, the de-facto standard for IDS signatures.
Finally a signature-based IDS has been chosen because anomaly-based IDS have always to be tuned to one specific network.
As has already been explained an IDS by itself is not sufficient to actually record very many attacks. It could only record attacks that do not need a response from the victim. Because IDS need services they can monitor, Honeyd provides fake-services on the sensors, so that for example a simple HTTP-conversation between an attacker and the victim, a sensor in this case, becomes possible. The fake-services currently provided by Honeyd can be taken from Table 1 . Knoppix is a CDROM-based Linux distribution with excellent support for most of the x86-compatible hardware. By adapting the CDROM-based Knoppix several advantages were achieved. The first was wide hardware support and virtually no installation effort for everyone running a sensor. The second advantage was enough space for all the software required.
The main disadvantage of a CDROM, i.e. no modifications are possible, is compensated by the individual floppy disk for each CSIRT running a sensor. Initially the floppy is used to distribute all keys and certificates necessary to pair the corresponding sensor in a cryptographically secure way with the manager.
At this point it has to be stressed that taking open source products based on open standards provided a very powerful and flexible system.
Fitting it all together
The central server running an instance of Prelude-Manager, a MySQL database and a Crypto-NTP server was easily set up.
More work had to be put into creating the CDROM for the sensors. The most laborious part was an Ncurses-based interface in order to offer a comprehensive and easy to use user interface for the configuration required. The configuration basically comprises the IP-setup and whether each component (Prelude-NIDS, Crypto-NTP, Honeyd) should be started or not. The floppy disk is used to permanently store these customisations.
To secure each sensor the Linux packet filter iptables was configured to only allow Honeyd to accept connections from the Internet. It has to be said, however, that a small risk still remains, e.g. if a flaw in iptables is found.
OPERATION

Getting started
Getting the sensors up and running went rather smoothly. In the beginning of September 2003 the first 4 sensors were online (see Table 2 ). The only issue that had to be addressed was that some IDS signatures mistakenly matched certain multicast protocols generating a huge number of alerts. Table 3 . Because of the fore-mentioned hardware failure in October, circa 9000 alerts were lost.
It is important to notice that one single attack can be recorded as several alerts. It is for example possible that a request via HTTP attempts unauthorised directory traversal. This would be counted as the first alert. If access to the file itself is prohibited, the second alert would be logged.
A question of practical concern is the amount of network bandwidth consumed by the communication between sensors and manager. Since each alert message also includes the offending packet the size may vary, but an average of 1250 bytes of IPdata per alert logged by a sensor was observed.
PUBLICATION AND EVALUATION OF COLLECTED DATA
First of all it has to be said that the IDS signatures in use have not been updated since the beginning of 2004. The main reasons for this are that the funding of the project eCSIRT.net ended as well as limited resources.
To provide access for the participants to all data collected the webfrontend ( [12] ) of the IDS manager was modified to use X.509 client certificates. Access to the data is read only to prevent accidental deletion of the database. The frontend displays all attack data (including the network packet raising the alarm) and generates simple statistics based on the number of alerts. Some additional statistics visualise the different types of recorded attack types and the "top-20-attackers". The figures 2 and 3 show some of these statistics.
First Statistics
More complex statistics that are not based on simple counting of alerts but require the correlation of different datasets cannot be created using the webfrontend. Therefore other tools were used to generate the attack statistics. For these statistics the different attack types were categorised into main classes according to their frequency of occurrence. Most of these classes are concerned with attacks against WWW services. This surely is at least partly due to the fact that some automatic attacks (for example those used by Internet worms) exploit vulnerabilities of web servers.
The main categories recognised for attacks are the following:
1) IIS cmd.exe and root.exe access: Attempts to access these files. 2) HTTP Request String Alerts: All attacks on web servers that exploit errors in the interpretation of URLs ( pathname evaluation). 3) Other IIS Attacks: All other attacks that target IIS in particular. 4) Other WEB Attacks: All other attacks against a web server.
These are mostly trials to access vulnerable CGI scripts or server add-ons like frontpage and WebDAV. 5) ICMP Scans: All types of ICMP echo requests. 6) All others: All remaining attacks.
Usually 80% of the attacks belong to either class 1 or 2. Fig. 4 shows the monthly overview for March 2004.
Verification of the Data
Signature-based IDS only record what previously has been stored in their signature database. Additionally, due to the setup of this project, Honeyd only offers a limited number of fakeservices, so that many attacks aren't even tried, because the required services don't exist.
In order to get a better understanding of the quality of the data gathered via Prelude, it seems desirable to compare this source to a different one.
For one of the sensors -namely the sensor hosted at PRESE-CURE -there exists data which was recorded using Argus (see
When comparing these different sources of data, it has to be kept in mind, that Prelude matches against rules in its signature database whereas the Argus output shows the number of attempted and successful connections 3 . Looking at Table 4 the first column simply lists all the ports. Those that haven't been looked at are summarised in the row "not included".
Because the sensor is of course not in productive use every access is unauthorised. Looking at columns 2 and 4 the Argus-numbers are mostly higher than the Prelude-numbers, e.g. TCP-ports 21, 22, 23 and 25. This can be probably explained by the fact that some attacks cannot be carried out because emulation of the services is limited, i.e. Argus sees a connection, but Prelude can't see an attack.
For TCP-port 80 Prelude shows roughly twice as many alerts as connections recorded by Argus. This strongly hints at the fact, that one attack may cause several alerts.
Last, but not least, Table 4 clearly shows the blind spots of Prelude, i.e. the ports 135 etc. usually associated with services provided by several Microsoft operating systems.
Further Statistics
Further statistics implemented are (see tables 5 and 6 for the results of the first months):
Number of different attacks per attacker:
For each attacking host (identified via the source IP-address), also referred to as attacker, the number of different attacks seen by the sensors are displayed. This gives an insight into the repertoire of attacks the attackers have at hand, for example in September 2003 107 attackers used 4 different types of attacks.
Number of attacked sensors per host:
This statistic makes use of the distribution of the sensors in different networks. An attacker that is seen by many sensors is obviously scanning the Internet very aggressively for potential victims. Some of the attackers probed nearly all sensors in a single month so they seem to use a very fast and aggressive algorithm to scan the net, for example in December 2003 20 attackers attacked 4 different sensors. The number of different attacks from each host (Table 5) shows that the repertoire of the attackers is not limited to single exploits. Three and more trials to gain access to a server are frequently undertaken, usually controlled by automatic scripts as can be concluded from the short time intervals between the attacks. Some sensors were obviously directly scanned by network security tools like Nessus that keep a database of many different attacks. These attempts generate more than a hundred alerts on a single sensor.
The aggressive probing for vulnerable hosts is shown in Table 6 . Even with a small number of sensors that are widely distributed over the Internet some attacking hosts probed nearly all of the sensors in one month. While these cases are rare attackers trying more than half of the sensors in a month are seen quite often.
The following estimation may be of interest: Considering about 18,000 attackers per month, there are 2570 attackers on each of the seven sensors, so there are about 3.5 attackers per hour 4 . And each attacker may launch more than one attack. So we can assume that systems not permanently connected to the Internet (private hosts using a dial-up connection) are at risk to be the target of an attack any time.
All these public statistics do not permit conclusions on certain attacks against single sensors. This ensures the privacy of the data submitted. In addition to the generic statistics there are internal statistics that show the number of alerts for each sensor. The operators of the sensors get access to all the data logged so they can get an overview over the different characteristics of attacks in the different networks. 4 This number is already a lower bound because in the beginning less than seven sensors were running (see Table 2 ). Furthermore the number of attacks (not attackers) counted is noticeably greater than 100,000 (though this includes possibly two alerts for a single attack). 
PERSPECTIVE
The first results are very promising and satisfactory. On the technical side there were almost no problems. The data collected provides very interesting insights into the behaviour of attackers on the Internet of today. For one, attackers obviously tend to try many different attacks on one single target -most likely through the use of automated tools. This, in conjunction with the bare number of attackers seen per hour, gives good estimations about the degree of danger the average system with an Internet connection is exposed to.
The distributed sensor network facilitates a more holistic view of attacks and threats in the Internet. It is especially possible to compare and correlate events from different and independent locations in the Internet. Since the Internet is facing more and more global threats the approach of the distributed sensor network seems an appropriate means to gain better understanding of such attacks. In addition cooperation between different CSIRTs is fostered. It is for example possible to directly exchange alert data using IDMEF or to export certain alerts as IO-DEF objects (see [4] ).
An expansion with respect to the number of sensors is planned and easily possible; largely due to the fact that sensors can easily be placed in corporate LANs without logging any sensitive data.
Also the sensor itself (i.e. the bootable CDROM) will be evolved further. The most import enhancement will be the ability to automatically update the IDS signatures. This really is a must since the signatures currently in use are too old. Thanks to this it will be possible to very closely monitor the spreading of new worms and viruses. In addition to this the sensors will be prepared to allow for automatic updates of Honeyd fake-services as well as the recording of Argus data.
Further statistical analyses of the alerts collected will be conducted. This should yet give a better understanding of the nature of today's attacks and eventually amount to an early warning system of emerging attacks of unknown worms and comparable threats.
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